Whether it's a giant infrastructure plan or a humble kitchen renovation, it'll inevitably take way too long and cost way too much. That's because you suffer from “the planning fallacy.” (You also have an “optimism bias” and a bad case of overconfidence.) But don't worry: we've got the solution.
This is an unofficial transcript meant for reference. Accuracy is not guaranteed.
This podcast dynamically inserts audio advertisements of varying lengths for each download. As a result, the transcription time indexes may be inaccurate.
If you'd like to listen to free economic radio without ads the place to do that, is sticker premium five dollars a month and you can get free month trial, by going to stick your premium dot com and use a promo code freak. You also get access to all our bonus. Episodes and you'll be supporting our show to that sticker premium: dot, com, promo code, freak thanks in nineteen sixty eight. Fifty years ago, the governor of New York State Nelson Rockefeller received a proposal he'd commissioned it addressed the mass transit needs of the New York City area. One centrepiece of the plan was a new subway line that would run from lower Manhattan the EAST side and into the Bronx. It was called the second Avenue something. Four years later, Rockefeller in New York City, marriage on Lindsey held a groundbreaking ceremony for the Second Avenue Subway, but not long afterward. The project was shelved because of a fiscal grey.
Years later, a new governor, Mario Cuomo tried to restart it, but once again the budget would not allow an back. It went on the shelf by now. The Second Avenue Subway had become the punchline new Yorker would promise to pay back alone. Once the Second Avenue Subway was built, it came to be known as the most famous thing: it's nice, I have been built in New York City, but then along came a man named Michael hear him say it Michael ordinary Channel. If you look the people- and Second avenue would recognize me- is that the reach no
these are really willing to pronounce my last night. Ok, let's go with doktor each. He is a long time, transportation, scholar in executive in two thousand, I e became president of capital construction for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and when the first thing he did was restart the Second Avenue subway by now it was forty years since Governor Rockefellers original proposal, Doktor H, updated the budgets and estimates and finally got construction started in two thousand ten. A massive tunnel boring machine began its work underneath. Ninety seven dream, so they are about to start and they re probed heads into the rock and then suddenly the railways Asian is that the quality of the rock was poor. In effect, there was
What are you going to their so the decision was made that we have to freeze about closer to blocks. I took us four months to actually freeze the ground it is closely on second avenue, we ten million dollars to do it ten million dollars in four months, just to freeze the ground. Just start building the tunnel with New York City ever get its Second Avenue subway. The reason the story became so famous is it. It is such a grotesque example of a blown deadline, but surely you can identify? Surely you been involved in maybe a work project door whom renovation in writing a paper that was also grotesquely late and painful inexpensive.
Today on for economics radio. Why are we so so so bad finishing projects on time? And what are we supposed to do about it? from W and Y see studios? This is for economics, radio broadcasts that explores the hidden side of everything. Here's your house, Stephen Abner. Today's episode begins, as so many good things do in right. Well, I'm Roger Bueller, and I'm a professor of psychology at Wilfred Lorry University at Waterloo Ontario. I study Social, ignition, as well as judgment and decision making bureau.
It is long wanted to know why were so bad at managing projects. His interest began during grad school with a personal puzzle Every night as I leave the office, I pack up my briefcase with jobs to do at home, and more often than not I'd come back to the office the next day with all of it untouched, but two, Every night, as I packed up that brief case, I was sure let my plans were realistic, so that was the point. Why wouldn't I learn from experience? More realistic in my in my estimates in the beginning, did you think it must just be me. I must be the one who's failing here: did you to recognise it as a generalised will finance well? He had seen the odd, but then I noticed it and people around me to. In fact, I remember some particular colleagues who were for ever promising things and never coming through and unnoticed,
well, they seem to believe it, though, when their when they're saying at it seems real. So it did start to seem like, our generalise abode thing. Bueller and his colleagues were, of course, not unique, the phenomenon even had a name. Courtesy of the psychologists stand economy and I must firstly, they had called it the planning thousand. So the planning as he is a tendency to underestimate the time it will take to complete a project while, knowing that similar projects have typically taken longer in the past. So it's a combination of optimistic prediction about a particular case
in the face of more general knowledge that would suggest otherwise. You can imagine the value of being able to diagnose and treat the planning fallacy. We all plan for the future, whether to huge infrastructure, project or research paper. That's do in three weeks when it be nice able to plan better, so first Roger Bueller and some colleagues set out to measure the planning fallacy. Their first experiment used honour students who were working on their thesis projects. The researchers asked each student to predict when they submit their thesis. I know psychologist make use of students too much, but
for this research. They really do have a lot of activities on the go on their kind of concrete activities, often with clear deadlines, making them a nice population to actually study for this topic. These students predicted on average that their theses would take thirty three point: nine days to finish: how long did it actually take fifty five point? Five days, it's a sixty four percent of Rich Mueller and other researchers gun similar evidence of the planning fallacy among stockbrokers, an electrical engineers and doctors. They also found it in everyday activities like Christmas shopping. Do taxes, even waiting a line for gas. So let me ask you the largest and most impossible question. What's wrong with us, why is there such a gap between intention of behaviour right? Will my things This has been guided by a distinction drawn by common diversity between two types of thinking.
One being in kind of inside approach and there being an outside approach and the insight approach involves really focusing on the case at hand and trying to work out. The details of that unique case is like you, developing a mental scenario. Mental simulation of how you think that project will unfold. But the problem is that mental simulations, often don provide a thorough and comprehensive representation of how things work they tend to often be kind of idealized over simplified, and when people get into that frame of thought, they dont entertain alternative ways in which things may go. They kind of get locked into one scenario, but then I would couple that with also peoples wishes and desires. So generally, when your plea
something out you're planning to succeed, you're, not planning to fail. This second tendency that Bueller is talking about seeing the future rosy terms, there's a name for that too. It's called the optimism bias. I think it's a wonderful thing, tally share. It is a cognitive neuroscientist at university Ouch London. There are so many positive aspects to having an optimism bias. In fact, in our research we see that the people without optimism, bias tent in most cases to be slightly depressed. At least
the severe depression being related to a pessimistic bias where people expect the future to be worse than it ends. Up being so I mean it's a good thing, because a kind of drives us forward it gives his motivation and makes us explore different things. It's related to better health, both physical and mental health, because if we expect positive things, then stress and anxieties reduced. So that's very good for both physical and mental health share. It believes in the optimism bias, and she believes it is rooted in neuroscience her experiments have repeatedly shown the brain tends to process positive information about the future more readily the negative information. It's easy to see how that could feed the planning fallacy. So, for example, if I too, you you know, you're getting get many more listeners this week than usual you'd say: oh ok, can you kind of change your estimate and think it's gonna be ten million, but if I tell you you're, and get many less listeners this week, then you expects you'd say while she doesn't know what she's talking
that's exactly what I was saying in my mind. You say you do you believe that something like the optimism bias was, is baked in for legitimate or positive evolutionary purposes, and or do you think it's more As you know, a little bit of a design flawed that we ve learned can have some benefit. So I think it's not a design flaw and it's a two parts answer. So the first part answer is: you know it's probably there, because of all the positive aspects that I just mentioned, write me. We know that people are optimist live longer, so we survive more, where more likely to find a partner or more likely to have kids and all of that. So there is a clear survival benefit and benefit to just progressing However, as you imply, there are also these negative consequences right. If we think everything's going to be okay or better than what we anticipate, we might not take precautionary action. We might see no smoke when we shouldn't and in that
things. Are there the negative aspects to it, but what our research shows is at its even better than than what I just explained, because the optimism bias is in fact flexible. So it changes in response to the environment. A can disappear under.
Environments in a way that may be optimal. Here's what share it means by then. She and her colleagues run experiments in which they have different kinds of people- fire fighters, for instance, to assess the likelihood of bad things happening to them, getting divorced or being in a car crash or getting diagnosed with cancer. These are basically their wild guesses, and then we give them information about the average likelihood of having these events for someone like them, and then we asked them again. Ok, so the firefighters would have their baseline guess and then they guess again after getting some statistical context, but there was another twist. They were also asked a question in two different environments on days when they ve been fighting fires and during downtime and they weren't, and what we
was that when the fire fighters were under stress, they learned more from this negative information, the more stress they were more anxious. They were the more likely they were to take in any kind of negative information that we gave them. You know whether it's about cancer divorce or being in a car accident and so on, based on these results, sure argues that human optimism is both adaptive and beautiful. So, let's get to know the optimism bias may be a sort of evolution insurance policy against hopelessness and depression, and maybe it's their role in some astounding progress, the human it is made over the money. It have to be pretty optimistic to come up with space travel, an aspirin french cuisine Spa, but still when it be nice to also figure out how to get projects done on time and on budget. That is something that can,
turn milkman has been thinking about four years. I'm an associate professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Milk means Phd is in computer science and business, but as an undergrad, she studied operations. Research, which means what you try to figure out, how to be more efficient about everything using math. To that end, milkman spend a lot of time studying and teaching the planning policy, and yet this does not personally inoculate her against it. Well, I will tell you that it took longer to prepare to talk to you about this than I expected the middle like along.
Like an hour, the lot nervous planning fallacy, I was sure, would take like ten minutes in her research. Milkman has found that, when group's work together on a project, a number of factors collude to form the planning fallacy, so one is over confidence or the tendency. We have to think we'll do things better than we will. We are over comfort for many many reasons. One is that us feel better about ourselves were often rewarded for it. Imagine two people walked into an interview and one of them says I'm gonna be graded, this job, I'm everything I do and the other persons, as I hope to be great at this job. I try to be great everything I do, but sometimes I fail. I think most of us would you
one more positively. The person who says I'm gonna be great, and that is a lifetime of feedback. We give people were rewarding them for overconfidence constantly, so their individual biases lake overconfidence, but with large projects there's also what's called coordination, neglect and coordination. Neglect is the failure to think about how hard it is to put stuff together when other people are involved, and so that can make the planning policy bigger and better when their teams of people trying to finish work on time from an economic standpoint, the sounds backwards? You would think the larger size theoretically creates more specialization of labour and ultimately higher productivity? Why doesn't it so? When you staff a bigger team on a project, you focus on all the benefits associated with specialization, what you just mentioned and what
neglect is to think about how challenging it is to get that work all back together into a single whole. So this engineer now to talk to that engineer, about how to combine their outputs into one integrated system in there's one more component of the planning Felsi blatantly obvious one. It also relates to procrastination because of self control failures we put it off and then that can make the planning fallacy a bigger issue, because if you don't start the project on time You keep putting it off how in the world. Are you going to finish it on time? And let me ask you this: what is if we have any idea the primary root cause of procrastination hook hush? What is the primary route? Crowds of deforestation like get the heart of everything, I've thought about for the last fifteen years and one question I think the primary root cause of procrastination is impulse control. The fact that we tend to want to do what's more instantly gratifying in a moment.
Then what is better for us, and so we put off doing the things we know. We should do in favour of what's instantly gratifying, There is reason to believe that our impulse control is being tested. Today, more than ever with the revolution in digital communication has come a blizzard of notifications, alerts, messages and more, while their obvious upsides to the speed and magnitude of this communication. There also costs information overload is thought to decrease: U S productivity by at least one trillion dollars a year. What to do about all that wonderful, terrible digital distraction! We brought that question to just in rows unseen under a founder and had product at a Sana a summer. For those who don't know what it is a start with that
as on software, that enables teams were able to work together more easily. Alright, but let's backup Rubinstein first job was at Google. Here's how he envisioned that job before began. I'm gonna be spending all my time, working with these world class engineers, world class designers, figuring out great things, we can do to reveal to make people's lives better and he did work on. Some excite projects. I was the original product manager Google Drive and helped convent alot of that I consented Gmail chat, but the reality of working at Google didn't match his vision of what Google, literally, the majority of the time, was spent not doing what not writing code, but was doing the work about work it was making, that the left hand knew what the right hand was doing. It was sitting status meetings in preparing status updates at first he thought he must have been doing something wrong. There's no This could be what everyone tolerates when they go to work and work in companies and so on
be this something that was wrong with Google talk to people who are to other companies and discovered to my horror that no girl was actually they advanced. Most companies were far the less organise he looked around for software solutions, there were a lot, but none that did what he wanted. But I really wanted was, just a single place that I could go to see. What is everyone on my team working on and who is responsible for which things and what's the sequence, the dependencies between those things so knights and weakens he started hacking together? Some software to accomplish and I just built it as something for me in a few dozen people that I worked with to use, but it grew viral. Google and that really startled me, because Google has asked The best tools in the world was in into me that there were so many people who were excited about what I built, but not long after Rosans Dean left Google for Facebook. At some points I got a facebook friend request from Deston Muscovites, whose their co founder of Facebook and servants who has persuaded that yeah be exciting,
to be a part of that. Your action, when the sad things about leaving Google was that I had to leave that tool behind that. I built inside of Google because it belonged to Google because Jago side is the actual proper to Google Rubinstein, Ass, Moskowitz Facebook and the same project management problems he'd seen at Google He was like. You have no idea. I am tearing my hair out by the time I get information about what the people in my own company are working on. The information is old that it's wrong by day. Rubinstein was helping invent facebooks lake button at night and on weekends. He in Moscow started talking about a software solution. To help me judge their workflow and at some point we start building at are actually implementing that solution, and this internal tool that we built at Facebook took off and they realize their solution wasn't unique to Facebook or Google or just tech companies what they had developed. He believed we developed a general solution that would enable any teams were able to work together more effectively. So this time
you only ip that is facebooks ip and the work that we did there? Actually Facebook still use it to this day, Rubinstein an Moskowitz eventually left Facebook to start up a Sana would really made us decide that we wanted to leave. Facebook was really feeling like this was itself a facebook size opportunity. So I understand that you understand, I guess, had an estimate for how long it would take to get the company up and running. I love you to talk about that and how long it they took. Yet we were hopeful, especially given that, by this point I had built some version of this twice and we're like moving about a year will fail to launch the first version of the product and it took three years by now. The sauna has a large and prestigious customer list there, one of dozens of companies, a build productivity, soft where the market is estimated at one point, two billion dollars
Sixteen like Katy Milkman, believes that a key to success here lies in mastering impulse control and in fighting distraction, continuous partial attention as this term for this state that is easy to get into if you're, not careful, where you're never quite focused on any one thing. And I think humans in general tended distract themselves, but we ve entered a world in which distraction has become more and more the norm yourself buzzing some chat message coming in and there is research from the universe California Irvine that every time you get interrupted, it takes twenty three minutes to fully recover. It is an irony, however. Isn't it in that year creating software to solve the problem that has been created essentially by software suffer has been big contributor to that problem, and, as I mentioned, I commented length letting this arms you used to work for yeah yeah. I thought about this issue.
Tibet. So this is all atonement, in other words, on some still now you plant this really important point. That their unintended consequences and as things I worked on in the past, have had this property, where, even if you have it tension that they'll be used entirely in a good way. Sometimes there negative things, you couldn't foresee. I think that the answer that is neither to shrug and just say well, whatever happens, happens, or is it to become a luddite and say it will. We have no idea what the unintended consequences of anything is going to be. So we shouldn't even try building things The middle way is to accept. There will always be unintended consequences, can notice those unintended consequences and then design through them.
Coming up on economics radio, how do you design through those consequences when it comes to going over budget? Here's one simple solution: you'd at forty percent to the budget and more generally, another solution, algorithms, and if you're, joining this podcast tell the world, leave us a rating or review on Apple, podcast or reverie. Listen can also tell your friends about us. The twitter, Facebook and linked in we'll be right back There are a lot of reasons why that project you planned can take way longer than you anticipated and cost way more
outright fraud. For instance, the lying, cheating and stealing familiar to just about any one has ever had say a home renovation, specially New York City and yes, I speak from personal experience. There's also downright incompetence, that's hard to plan for, but today we are talking about the planning fallacy which was formerly described a few decades ago by the psychologists, then economy and AMOS Durski when they started theorizing about how to correct for the planning fallacy they identified. What they thought was a key factor when people s
me how long a project will take. They focused too much on the individual quirks of that project and not enough on how long similar projects took. The second approach is called reference class forecasting, the reference class forecasts, as actually, if you're planning project acts that you're about to start ignore project acts. That's your l, Grushenka Cocaine. She teaches project management and decision making at the University of Virginias Durden School of business. Don't think about it too. Much. Look back! Look back at other projects. You ve done all the projects that are similar to this new project acts and book historically at how well those projects performed in terms of their plan verses, their actual see how accurate you were and then use that shift or use that uplift to adjust your new project that you're about to start, as we have seen with just in Rosen's dean and Katy milkman. Grisha cocaine does not always practice which breaches
pretty decent planner, but I'm not as organised as I would probably recommend. Other people be happy here. I'd like to improvise I am also on I'm israeli and Israelis are notorious for being pretty spontaneous by nature, so we we hate planning and I met it's a bridge too? As you know, the exact opposite, you know the Brits plan and what they want to eat for lunch in about six months time- and I, like I, don't know if I want custard pudding, I don't know, leave me alone. Rush cocaine has been studying the planning fallacy in governments as well as in private. And she likes the trend line. I will say that more and more companies these days are improving their performance overall. She believes that further improvement lies in a stronger embrace of
surprise year, data more and more government bodies are publishing some planned in some actual deadlines and budgets, and tracking performance and tracking historical plans and actual is the fundamental first step and overcoming the planning fallacy. So the main broad's insight is you? Should track your performance, because, if you just start with their hats, let alone anything more sophisticated, you would raise the profile of the issue as a performance issue within the organization, and you will improve one profession that exemplifies this improvement. Meteorologists believe it or not. While we like to give them a hard time, we all have whether apps on our phone and we trust them quite a great deal, because in putting it altogether the end of the day there pretty accurate with their predictions. And yes, they have sophisticated systems that decompose. What they're trying to predict
but they also track and they score themselves, and they keep record of how accurate they were, and only by doing that will you stand a chance to improve tracking and scoring the difference between forecasts and outcomes. That trend owes a lot to this man. My name has been phobia and on the professor, Oxford University, Sayd Business School Flabby are is an economic geographer who years ago became fascinated with infrastructure mega projects. It began in his native Denmark to Denmark Some states decided to start doing mega projects and the first major priority they did was a connection between east and west in mock and it when terribly wrong, and got curious and one that is this. Just bad luck! this common it was. He found out very common first, let's get a sense of the magnitude of the problem. Flew BR has estimated that interest sure projects with the budget above one billion dollars, add up to between six and nine trip,
dollars a year globally. That's about eight percent of global GDP software we ve studied estimated cost an actual out turn course far from hundreds of products around the world, and it turns out that eighty to ninety percent of all products have cost overruns. We get the same for schedule so, comparing estimated schedule, long. Would it take with action schedule? How lonely did actually take and found the same thing that the eighty to ninety percent of products have scheduled overall, so it takes longer many times years longer than originally planned. These data led flew pr to establish he calls the iron law of mega projects over budget overtime, on the benefits over and over again, and it's a long standing. So our data now go back a hundred years. We find that it's a very constant situation. It doesnt matter which part of the period you look at you. You have a constant caused overrun,
the constant scheduled run in the UK have constant benefits shortfalls. Ok, so why does this happen? The first theory, flew BR embraced, is called strategic, misrepresent which is essentially a fancy way of saying that you lie in order to get what you want with active, interviewed planners. Who said that they did. This briefly that they actually were incense advised to misrepresent the business case for that their products in their benefit Carson ETA. Isn't they wanted their products to look good on paper to increase their chances of getting funded and getting approval for their products, and they said we do this by underestimating the cost and always debating the benefits, because that gives us at nice high benefit course ratio so that we actually get chosen. This may strike you as intellectually dishonest, at the very least, but
strategy is endorsed by no less and authority than Danny Common himself, who won the Nobel Prize for Economics, issue realistically presented people. What can be achieved solving a problem? They would find that completely you can't get anywhere with that some degree of overtones so between strategic misrepresentation and the optimism bias. What do you suppose to do if you are on the commissioning end of a mega project? After all, the stakes are quite high, so if you have a lot of mega projects going wrong, your whole national accounting in funding system. In a way you planned. The budget for next year becomes very unreliable. Consider what the british government did with its official green book, which tracks public spending The UK government has a green book about estimating projects which was developed quite a while ago, because it turned out that all these projects, going
on all the time actually made it very difficult for the government to produce reliable budgets. So the UK decided to do something about that lit by the Treasury. Floppy are worked with the Uk Treasury and the Department of Transport. In order to get this right to get this right for infrastructure and transport, politics and in developing a methodology which has, in the meantime become mandatory in the UK for large projects and other countries have studied this say, including Denmark and Denmark has also made this method a mandatory in what is this mandatory method, basically its strategic misrepresentation in the opposite direction. Hey you. Do you doing an urban re project? You you'd you having a subway extension will you do all the usual conventional stuff? You'll get your cost estimate and your schedule estimates and then, on the basis of empirical evidence, you maintain a database documenting how much the budgets
usually underestimated for this type of product. How much is the schedule usually underestimated for this type of product then you're using the numbers from previous products to adjust the numbers for the new project that you're doing so they say. That on average product school forty percent over budget dude at at forty percent to the budget for you in project, and then you would have been much more accurate budget, but what about perverse incentives? If the contractor knows your expecting them to come in forty percent over budget and over deadline to where's their incentive to work hard? that's very important and we actually don't recommend using this methodology unless you incentivize contractors, because you could make the situation much worse. This is something that we didn't ignore when we develop this with the UK government and the danish government. So at the same time, MRS Methodology ways say made mandatory. It was also made mandatory there,
in that the people involved in delivering these products would would have they have skin in the game is recorded. So you need to write your contract, for instance, in a manner where the contractor will will gain. Additional profit if they actually meet your targets, but they will also be punished by having to a Ford and they will make less profit if they dont need your target,
so how well is this worked it hard to be to definitive. This system has been in place only since two thousand for and big infrastructure projects have long timelines, but a preliminary analysis than by outside researchers has found the projections to be reasonably accurate and cost overruns to be reasonably small about seven percent from the planning stages of transportation project to completion, all of which suggests that pricing, in the optimism, bias and using reference class forecasting, are truly useful tools to fight the planning thousand Katy milkman, as I learned as one more suggestion. So let me ask you this, considering that the planning fallacy is as wide as large as it is, and in the considering all the costs I mean you can just imagine construct
nor in medicine all these costs? It can rack up what should be done about it, algorithms, as easy see later it's there is such a clear answer to this. One is frustratingly hard to convince people for reasons that I don't know if you ve come. Algorithm aversion on your podcast, but people are very diverse using algorithms for all sorts of reasons that I think, are a little crazy anyway. Algorithms are the answer so when I think of people who don't have a planning fallacy I think, of Amazon, so Lake. I Amazon, and I thought something I want Tell me when I'm gonna have it and then by an or even before then I have it probably ninety five percent of the time, so that doesn't seem so hard. What's the problem with everybody else and love that example, because Amazon relies on an algorithm to make that forecast, and they have lots of,
lots of data going into that algorithm because they ve literally solve this problem, probably billions of times before, and that is exactly how we cure the planning, fallacy, we use data instead of human judgment to make forecasts, and then we don't have this problem anymore, okay, so that sounds perfect and foolproof, but of course we don't always think mathematically. We don't have crazy statistical models in our mind that allow us to come up with exact, accurate predictions. That again, is your ill gruffly cocaine from the University of Virginia and you need the data, ok and we need to apply to know in a sensible way. You need to identify those similar projects. What is my reference class? You know it's not gonna, be just a bunch of projects with very different characteristics, so
going in finding similar references by definition? Not always gonna be easy, because projects are different in the difficulty of truly solving the planning. Felsi is perhaps best exemplified by our canadian friend Roger Buehler so you began by telling us that you got interested in the planning fallacy out of personal experiences. Bring this brief case home full of work and never get it done. Have you improved overtime, Unfortunately, no I'm still carrying around this overweight briefcase, I do think I've learned and that a more open to using my past experience then probably more likely, having studied it this many years too, to pause and ask myself: ok, what's what happened in the past, and I should take that but even so it's it's, it's not the knot railway to do it. It still takes effort to to make your predictions in that manner.
Easier to fall into an optimistic plan for the case at hand. Was there ever a more optimistic plan, the New York Governor Nelson Rockefellers plan to build the Second Avenue Subway New York City. As you will recall, the proposal was hatched in nineteen sixty eight. It was finally passed along to the metropolitan transportation authorities, Doktor H in two thousand eight. I cannot tell you, as I have one big thing, that created a problem, because there was not that you do have the little things that constantly interfere. Those little things tend to add up in two thousand seven, the empty. I pushed back
completion date. Two thousand fourteen a year later was pushed back another year same routine, the following year. It took a work, acceleration agreement, an and infusion of sixty six million dollars above the planned budget to finally bring the project home. On the last day of two, Sixty the governor Google, you celebratory ride the night of December thirty. First, we had a big party in the station in ninety six. Well, thank you. Much good evening to all of you what a great night that governor by the way, was Andrew Cuomo, whose son of one of the previous governors, Mario Cuomo, who tried to build the Second Avenue Subway today the project is cost four point: five billion dollars, making it per mile when the most expensive mass transit projects in-
ST, oh yeah. It also came in about seven hundred million dollars over budget and here's the best part, all that money and time went into building just two miles of tunnel in three new stations, not the eight and a half miles and fifteen stations in the original plan. Those are still to come. This doctor h sees it a deadline. This badly missed comes from some unexpected developments to be sure, but also deliberate deception. Quite frankly, most of these major projects are being started by people that never ending and flung about elected officials. So because they are the ones that made the decisions, there will have aggressive schedules and optimistic budgets. Why? Because they will have to show their constituents that this is done so now
If you start a project today, chances are that someone else will finish it. So I'm gonna take the view that I want job. Now I wanna get to be re elected for the next forty years. We're gonna be vision, then do all of these things in it. Your gun so now comes the mix sky. Were women and says: oh, it's gonna cost another. I don't know, half a billion dollars to completed so a lot of these projects They ve never actually happen if people were- and this is the unfortunate truth unless they presented a more optimistic view. Then, actually would be. The second phase of the second Emmy Subway line, another one and a half miles is now under
instruction it's set to call six billion dollars and open between two thousand and twenty seven and two thousand and twenty nine. How much would Dr H be willing to bet on a timely on budget completion, other building that I only bed one. I am sure that I can win rights. Re wouldn't bet on that at this point in how about his chances of Sunday riding the entire completed line all the way from on TAT Manhattan up to the Bronx me, though I have nowhere. Asian or will or or desire to leave that long coming up next time on economics, radio, we get into the costs and then fits of dragon babies since ancient times. Chinese people have believed that babies born dragon here were destined for success
do dragon kids really turn out to be more successful? If so, why, and does it happen in America to its next time? On for economics, radio Economics radio is produced by W and my c studios and w productions? This episode with produced by Alvin Meloth, our staff also includes Alison Hockenberry, Gregg Zawoiski, Stephanie Tam MAX Miller, Merit Jacob Veer, Carruthers Harry Huggins and Brain Gutierrez. The music you hear throughout our episodes was composed by the we scared you can subscribe to for economics, radio and apple podcast or any
number of podcast portals. You should also check out our archive and for economic dot com. You can also stream or download. Every episode with ever made can also read the transcripts in fine links to the underlying research. Our show can also be heard on NPR stations across the country check your local station from schedule also on serious exam Spotify. We can be found on Twitter, Facebook linked in or the email at radio at for economics. Dotcom thanks for listening.
Transcript generated on 2021-01-21.